THE CYPRUS PROBLEM:
THE CHALLENGE FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
March 17, 1999

1999 marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 1974 Turkish invasion and subsequent partial occupation of Cyprus. The intervening years have been filled with unsuccessful attempts by the United States and other members of the international community to find a solution. As U.S. and UN officials have publicly stated, the fault has been on the Turkish side.

In 1998 a new element in the form of the opening of accession negotiations with the European Union was introduced. Formal negotiations began on March 31 and the substantive phase began on November 10. This process may provide the long sought-after catalyst to progress.

In the United States and international community, there is widespread agreement that the status quo is unacceptable. U.S. officials have undertaken successive visits to the region. The United Nations is pursuing a new 'Good Offices' mission endorsed by a new set of Security Council resolutions passed in December 1998.

With key U.S. political, security, and economic interests at stake in the region, the benefits of a settlement would be considerable. A long-running source of regional tension would be removed, thus enhancing overall regional stability. A settlement might pave the way for a wider Greek-Turkish rapprochement. In Cyprus itself the benefits would also be significant, most notably in terms of political, economic, and social advances for the whole island.

As with all long-running international disputes, the Cyprus problem has a detailed history and a specialized vocabulary. This guide sets out the background to the issues, including historical notes, the role of the international community, the U.S. interests, and the major components of previous initiatives.

The guide concludes with a statement of the American Hellenic Institute's position on a realistic approach to the Cyprus problem.

Background

Both in Cyprus and within the international community new initiatives on Cyprus's future are underway. On December 23, 1998 President Bill Clinton stated that "1999 can offer significant opportunities to achieve progress toward a Cyprus settlement that will meet the concerns of the parties involved."

These initiatives reflect the widespread agreement in the United States that the status quo is unacceptable. On June 10, 1998 Chairman Ben Gilman (R-NY) of the House International Relations Committee stated "we are hearing from certain Turkish officials that the present situation on Cyprus, a division of the island and 35,000 Turkish troops is a solution, their solution. This of course is completely unacceptable to our nation and the international community." On May 15, 1997 House of Representatives Concurrent Resolution 81 stated: "The status quo on Cyprus is unacceptable and detrimental to the interests of the United States in the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond."

"The status quo on Cyprus is unacceptable and detrimental to the interests of the United States in the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond."

U.S. mediation efforts reflect President Clinton's statement on December 23, 1998 that "the US remains deeply committed to finding a viable solution to the Cyprus problem." Over the past two years, Cyprus has received significant high-level U.S. attention. On September 15, 1997 Secretary of State Madeleine Albright carried out a brief stopover in Cyprus. In 1998 both Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the Special Presidential Emissary and Ambassador Thomas Miller, the State Department Special Coordinator for Cyprus, have undertaken multiple visits to the region, including visits to Cyprus in March 1999 and April, May, and December 1998. During these visits they have met with President Glafcos Clerides and Mr. Rauf Denktash, the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community.

Internationally, a similar pattern of activity has been underway in Cyprus and the region. On September 30, 1998 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan launched a 'Good Offices' initiative undertaken through the UN Special Representative in Cyprus, Dame Ann Hercus, who has undertaken a series of consultations with President Clerides and Mr. Denktash. Referring to the continuing division of Cyprus as "unacceptable," the UN Security Council endorsed this initiative in its resolutions 1217 (1998) and 1218 (1998) passed on December 23, 1998. These initiatives follow-up the face-to-face meetings between President Clerides and Mr. Denktash in July and August 1997 under UN auspices in New York and Switzerland. Further meetings on humanitarian and security issues have taken place in Nicosia.

Finally, the European Union has played an important role. Following the decision of the December 12-13, 1997 European Council held in Luxembourg, the European Union began formal accession negotiations with Cyprus on March 31, 1998. The substantive phase began on November 10, 1998.

With key U.S. political, security, and economic interests at stake in the region, the benefits of a settlement would be considerable. A long-running source of regional tension would be removed, thus enhancing overall regional stability. A settlement might pave the way for a wider Greek-Turkish rapprochement. In Cyprus itself the benefits would also be significant, most notably in terms of economic and social advances for the Turkish Cypriot community.

The search for a settlement has encountered entrenched resistance on the Turkish side, where a hard-line approach heavily influenced by the Turkish military has predominated. This seeks to transform the occupied areas into an independent sovereign entity and thus to make permanent the partition of Cyprus. On January 12, 1999, Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit stated that "the reality of two separate states in Cyprus cannot be denied." On December 23, 1998 Turkey criticized the UN initiative stating that "accepting the existence of two separate sovereign and equal states emerges as a necessity in the Cyprus question." On November 15, 1998, Mr. Sukru Sina Gurel, the Turkish Minister of State responsible for Cyprus affairs, stated that "the existence of two separate peoples, orders, and states on the island must be acknowledged."

This approach followed on Turkey's very negative reaction to the December 1997 EU decision to commence accession negotiations with Cyprus. On December 14, 1997, then Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz stated that Turkey would "intensify integration" between the illegally occupied parts of Cyprus and Turkey. On January 4, 1998 he stated that the EU decision would result in the permanent partition of Cyprus. The Turkish government has also tried to draw a link between its own aspirations for EU membership and a Cyprus settlement.

Turkish Cypriot attitudes have also been negative. On March 2, 1999, Mr. Denktash stated that "there is no meaning in sitting at the negotiating table." On December 23, 1998 Mr. Denktash rejected the UN initiative stating that "The only choice left to us is to resist." This negative approach followed a similarly rejectionist reaction to the opening of substantive EU negotiations on November 10, 1998. Mr. Denktash released a statement affirming that the occupied areas would move toward full integration with Turkey. This negative approach has been characteristic of Mr. Denktash over the past years. On a visit to Washington in October 1997 Mr. Denktash described himself as "Mr. No." Before the opening of EU negotiations with Cyprus, Mr. Denktash spoke of the possibility of war should these commence.

In the wake of the EU decision on negotiations with Cyprus, Mr. Denktash cut off all intercommunal contacts in Cyprus and demanded international recognition of the illegal Turkish Cypriot entity and the withdrawal of Cyprus' EU application. He has refused to participate in the Cypriot delegation to the accession negotiations, although invited to do so by the Cypriot government and the EU. These acts have drawn criticism from within the Turkish Cypriot community. On September 2, 1998 Turkish Cypriot opposition leader Mehmet Ali Talat stated that Denktash's approach "contradicts all previous understandings, the summit agreements, as well as the UN resolutions" and "does not serve the interests of the Turkish Cypriots."

"The reason we could not make progress this time was because the Turkish side has changed its position."

Turkish resistance has drawn American criticism. Following his visit to Cyprus on May 1-3, 1998, Ambassador Holbrooke and the State Department spokesman publicly blamed the Turkish side for the resultant deadlock. Ambassador Holbrooke stated that "the reason we could not make progress this time was because the Turkish side has changed its position." On May 5, EU Commissioner for External Affairs Hans van den Broek reiterated this criticism, stating "Mr. Denktash's terms cannot be accepted and his stance has confirmed his intransigence." On June 10, 1998, Senator Joe Biden, Ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, spoke of "a stone wall of Turkish Cypriot obduracy in the form of two preconditions: recognition of the 'TRNC' and withdrawal of Cyprus' application to the European Union."

Future progress depends largely on Turkey's willingness to commit itself to serious negotiations. Turkey regards itself, in the words of then Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz on June 2 1997, as the "primary interlocutor" on Cyprus. However, under the direction of the military, geo-strategic calculations have dominated Turkish thinking. For example, on May 13, 1998 retired Admiral Dogan Beyazit said that "Cyprus is located on a strategic sea-route in the Mediterranean, is near to the oil wells and is vital for Turkey's future."

These attitudes have caused Turkey to be generally unwilling to enter substantive negotiations and to instruct the Turkish Cypriots to adopt an intransigent approach, for example their demand to be treated as a sovereign state, described by Prime Minister Ecevit on January 11, 1999 as "very appropriate and supported by our government." While these and other similar demands persist, the prospects for progress are severely diminished.

Guide to the Issues

The central issue before the international community is relatively clear-cut. Will Cyprus remain a unified state in accordance with international law or will the present illegal state of de facto partition, occupation, and secession be allowed to stand?

As with all long-running international disputes, the Cyprus problem has a detailed history and a specialized vocabulary. These include: the breakdown of intercommunal relations; regional power politics; Cold War rivalries; foreign aggression and interference; the 1974 Turkish invasion; the continuing Turkish occupation; forced population displacement; human rights violations; disregard for the rule of law. This guide (which updates the January 1998 edition) outlines the key events, issues, and U.S. positions. A glossary of the main technical terms (highlighted in bold type) is also provided.

Background to the Problem

Cyprus is the third largest Mediterranean island with an area of 3,572 square miles (somewhat smaller than Connecticut.) Cyprus dates back its history for 8,000 years. Its origins and culture are Greek. From 1571-1878 it was part of the Ottoman Empire. From 1878 to 1960 it was under British rule. Its population is 736,636 of which 81% is Greek Cypriot and 18% Turkish Cypriot, with the balance comprising Armenians and Maronites.

Following talks between Britain, Greece, and Turkey culminating in the Zürich and London Agreements, Cyprus gained independence from Britain in 1960 as an independent, sovereign, and unitary state. Its legal name is the Republic of Cyprus. The 1960 constitution provided for strict power-sharing between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, with the latter (an 18% minority population) having veto powers over all major legislation and being entitled to a disproportionate share in ministerial, parliamentary, civil service, army and police posts.

This constitution rapidly proved unworkable. In 1963 first the Turkish Government in Ankara and later the Turkish Cypriot leadership rejected offers of constitutional amendments proposed by Cyprus President Makarios to overcome the constitutional deadlock. Prompted by Turkey, the Turkish Cypriot ministers and other officials withdrew from the government. At the same time the Turkish military contingent on Cyprus unilaterally took up positions to the north of Cyprus's capital Nicosia. The security situation on the island deteriorated into intercommunal violence, fanned by ultra nationalist elements on both sides. British and UN sponsored mediation efforts failed to restore order. In the face of an explicit threat of invasion from Turkey and escalating internal unrest, the UN established a peace-keeping force (UNFICYP) in Cyprus in March 1964.

In the immediately following years, attitudes on all sides hardened. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership intensified their efforts aimed at achieving a permanent partition (taksim) of the island. In Greece and Cyprus ultra nationalists renewed demands for union (enosis) with Greece. During this period, the position of the international community crystallized around a set of broad principles (excluding partition and union) that have remained constant to this day, namely that:

• Cyprus should remain a unified state.

• Cyprus should enjoy full sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence.

• There should be no foreign intervention or interference.

• Normal intercommunal relations should be restored.

Despite continuing intercommunal tensions, the search for reconciliation did not cease. From 1968-74 Greek and Turkish Cypriot representatives held a series of UN-sponsored talks seeking a framework for a normalization of relations between the two communities. Some progress was made, including in 1968 an explicit renunciation of enosis by President Makarios. During this period tensions were lessened and there were no incidents of intercommunal violence.

In 1974 this conciliatory trend was shattered first by the July 15, 1974 coup against President Makarios engineered by the Greek junta and ultra nationalist elements in Cyprus and then five days later by the illegal Turkish invasion. In the course of this invasion (and in follow-on aggression in August in defiance of UN cease-fire agreements), Turkish forces occupied some 37% of the territory of Cyprus, leading to large scale refugee flight, ethnic partitioning, and property destruction. This situation endures to this day. Over 35,000 Turkish troops remain on Cyprus.

The Search for a Settlement(Early Events

In response to the Turkish invasion, the international community engaged itself actively in the search for a settlement, with the UN providing the main forum in the form of the Secretary-General's Mission of Good Offices. The focus of these efforts, whether in the form of bilateral talks, proximity talks, through the mediation of Special Representatives, or proposals for confidence-building measures, has been to promote a just and lasting solution to the problem based on the following objectives:

• To secure the removal of all foreign forces from the island.

• To bring about the return of refugees.

• To restore the sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Cyprus.

• To agree on new constitutional arrangements respecting the human rights of all the people of Cyprus.

Language to this effect may be found in successive UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, including GA 3212 (1974) of November 1, 1974, SCR 365 (1974) of December 13, 1974, SCR 939 (1994) of July 29, 1994, and (most recently) 1218 (1998). The first of these was passed unanimously, including a positive vote from Turkey.

Progress toward achieving these goals has been minimal. Significant policy reviews by the Greek Cypriot community to address the concerns of the Turkish Cypriot side, for example, the 1977 and 1979 High Level Agreements introducing the concepts of a bicommunal and bizonal federation, have not been reciprocated.

Instead, some serious backward steps have been taken. In 1975 the Turkish military authorities announced the establishment of the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus." Despite condemnation from the Security Council and other bodies such as the Council of Europe, Turkish efforts to establish a separatist state in the area under their control persisted, with Greek Cypriots being expelled from their homes and settlers from Turkey being imported, once again in defiance of international law and UN resolutions.

In 1983, the Turkish Cypriot leadership unilaterally declared the establishment of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus." This declaration, which the international community viewed as an attempt to dismember Cyprus, was condemned as illegal and invalid by SCR 541 (1983) of November 18, 1983. SCR 550 (1984) of May 11, 1984, called upon all states to refrain from recognizing the "TRNC" and from assisting or facilitating it in any way. Today, only Turkey recognizes the secessionist entity.

The Basis for a Settlement: The Key Principles

The broad framework of a settlement may be found both in documents agreed between the two Cypriot communities (for example, the 1977 and 1979 High Level Agreements) and in documents adopted by the international community (for example, SCR 939 (1994) of July 29, 1994). These include:

• A State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty, international personality, and a single citizenship.

• A central federal government with adequate powers and functions to safeguard the unity of the country.

• A territorial apportionment based on economic viability and land ownership.

• Safeguards for independence and territorial integrity.

• Respect for human rights.

• The Demilitarization of Cyprus.

• Two politically equal communities, as defined in the relevant Security Council resolutions.

• A bicommunal and bizonal federation.

• The exclusion of any union in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or secession.

In addition to these principles, certain specific constitutional provisions have been put forward. These include:

• The President and Vice-President to come from different communities.

• The Lower House to be divided 70-30 between the communities.

• The Upper House to have numerically equal representation from the two communities.

• Territory to be divided approximately 75%-25% between the communities.

In terms of practical implementation of these principles and proposals, the Republic of Cyprus government has recognized that security is the key concern for all Cypriots. It has therefore proposed the total demilitarization of Cyprus, with security being provided by a Multinational Force under international command (to which both Greece and Turkey might contribute units) mandated to guarantee a constitutional settlement. It has further proposed that the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee be modernized.

The European Union--Catalyst for Regional Stability

Following the December 1997 European Council in Luxembourg, the EU began accession negotiations with Cyprus on March 31, 1998. On November 10, the substantive phase of the negotiations began. Solid progress has achieved since that time. On January 15, 1999, Mr. Leopold Maurer, the EU chief negotiator for Cyprus, stated that Cyprus had advanced more rapidly than the other candidate countries in the accession process. President Clerides has reaffirmed that representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community are welcome to participate in these negotiations as members of a unitary delegation of the Republic of Cyprus. On November 10, 1998 he stated: "The road toward accession offers us new possibilities and avenues for cooperation between the two communities of Cyprus. It is our earnest desire that our Turkish Cypriot compatriots share the task of preparing Cyprus for EU membership."

"The road toward accession offers us new possibilities and avenues for cooperation between the two communities of Cyprus. It is our earnest desire that our Turkish Cypriot compatriots share the task of preparing Cyprus for EU membership."

Cyprus already has a long association with the EU beginning in 1972 when it entered into an association agreement with then European Economic Community. In 1987 Cyprus signed a Customs Union protocol. It applied for full membership in 1990. Given the 1993 opinion by the European Commission that Cyprus meets the criteria for EU membership (including the Maastricht criteria for European Monetary Union), these negotiations are likely to lead to Cyprus's accession. On January 1, 1999 the Cyprus Central Bank announced that the Cyprus pound would be pegged to the Euro. On January 15, 1998 British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook stated, "In our view, there is no legal obstacle for Cyprus to become a full European Union member. On the contrary, we consider Cyprus as being one of the strongest candidates." On November 10 Cook stated that: "We do not believe that accession of Cyprus should be made conditional on a solution to the division of the island."

EU legal counsel have confirmed that the Treaty of Guarantee does not constitute a legal barrier to Cyprus's accession. The U.S. has welcomed Cyprus' negotiations with the EU. On December 14, 1998 Ambassador Richard Holbrooke stated: "The United States believes that the EU made the right decision to invite Cyprus to join the organization. In fact, we applauded it."

EU expansion is expected to act as a catalyst for regional political and economic advance, including for Cyprus. Given that Cyprus will accede to the EU as a single state, it is greatly to be preferred that the Cyprus problem is solved so that the whole of Cyprus can enjoy the undisputed political, security, social and economic benefits accruing from EU membership. In the event that no settlement is forthcoming, however, the tangible benefits of EU membership will not extend to the area under illegal Turkish occupation, so long as that occupation continues, thus retarding political integration and economic development in this area.

The benefits of a settlement would be significant, especially for the Turkish Cypriot community who at present are out of the international mainstream. By facilitating island-wide development and by allowing the occupied areas to participate in the global economy, the Turkish Cypriot community, whose present per capita income is only a quarter of that of the Greek Cypriots, would be among the principal beneficiaries of a settlement. According to a poll conducted in December by the Cyprus Public Opinion and Market Research Company (COMAR) an overwhelming majority (89.6%) of Turkish Cypriots favor joining the EU in the expectation that this will confer tangible benefits in such areas as education, employment, health, and security. A sizable majority (76.6%) also believed that EU accession would allow Turkish Cypriots to close the economic gap with Greek Cypriots.

"The United States believes that the EU made the right decision to invite Cyprus to join the organization. In fact, we applauded it."

The regional benefits would extend far beyond the economic sphere. A settlement in Cyprus would remove a malignant source of regional instability. It might pave the way for a wider agreement between Greece and Turkey. Turkey would be freed of the annual financial costs of subsidizing the occupied areas to the amount of about $500 million. It would also benefit from the prospect of a less troubled relationship with the EU, the UN, and other international organizations. The resultant strengthening of regional stability would significantly enhance U.S. interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Political and Military Consequences of Failure

The consequences of failure are also increasingly serious. The possibilities range from perpetuation of the present unstable situation to the outbreak of hostilities. The response of Turkey to the start of EU accession negotiations with Cyprus has been hostile. Both before and after that decision Turkey has taken steps to further the integration of the illegally occupied parts of Cyprus into Turkey. On July 20, 1997, Mr. Denktash and Turkish Deputy Prime Minster Bulent Ecevit, who as Turkish Prime Minister in 1974 launched the illegal invasion of that date, signed a joint declaration setting out proposals for the full-scale political, economic, and defense integration into Turkey of the occupied areas of Cyprus. On August 6, Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem signed an agreement with Mr. Denktash that set up an "association council" to determine the measures to be taken for partial integration between Turkey and the occupied areas and to monitor their implementation. On January 12, 1998, Turkey signed a "Functional and Structural Cooperation Protocol" with the occupied area. On April 23, Mr. Denktash visited Turkey to put this protocol into effect.

These moves have been condemned by the international community, including the U.S. Administration. On August 7, 1997 the State Department spokesman described the "association council" as unhelpful and called upon its sponsors not to take "any steps that undermine the UN negotiation process or which move toward the permanent partition of the island."

The potential military consequences of failure are also alarming. Throughout 1998 senior Turkish officials made repeated threats to take military action if Cyprus implemented its proposal to acquire the anti-aircraft defensive S-300 missile system. On June 2, 1998, for example, Turkish Deputy Prime Minister and National Defense Minister Ismet Sezgin confirmed that the Turkish general staff had prepared "all the necessary measures" in the event of the system's deployment in Cyprus. Although this proposal was cancelled by the Cyprus Government on December 29, 1998, the belligerent saber-rattling instigated by the Turkish military underlines the fact that Cyprus remains an international flashpoint.

The Position of Greece

As a party to the 1960 Treaties establishing the Republic of Cyprus and as a result of its defense agreement with Cyprus, Greece is committed to the defense of Cyprus. This commitment was reaffirmed by Prime Minister Costas Simitis on January 6, 1999. Successive Greek governments, including the present, have reaffirmed that an attack on Cyprus would represent an attack on Greece. These ties aside, however, Greece is not a direct party to the Cyprus problem other than as one of the guarantor powers and as a member of the EU and NATO. Greece fully accepts Cyprus' separate international identity. As such, Cyprus is not a bilateral problem between Greece and Turkey but a problem of invasion and occupation of a sovereign member of the UN. There is no linkage between Cyprus and Greece's other unresolved issues with Turkey and it is inappropriate to address these issues as a "package." It is safe to say, however, that a settlement of the Cyprus problem would greatly improve the climate in Greek-Turkish relations.

U.S. Policy

In view of the strong U.S. and NATO interest in Eastern Mediterranean stability, successive US administrations have followed events there closely, on occasions intervening vigorously to head off the threat of regional hostilities. In June 1964, President Lyndon Johnson sent a written warning to the Turkish government not to take military action over Cyprus. Johnson's letter explicitly ruled out a settlement of the Cyprus problem based on partition. In November 1967, the U.S. again took action to prevent a threatened Turkish invasion of Cyprus (for which the Turkish military had mobilized.)

The Turkish invasion of 1974 (when U.S.-provided arms were illegally used by Turkey) evoked differing responses from the U.S. Administration and Congress. The then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger tilted for the aggressor (Turkey) and against the victim (the Republic of Cyprus). He refused to apply the provisions of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act mandating the immediate halt in U.S. aid to an instigator of aggression.

The U.S. Congress, by contrast, adopted more direct action. Against the administration's wishes, it passed a rule of law amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act in December, 1974. This placed an arms embargo on Turkey, effective February 5, 1975, that lasted until August, 1978.

Since that time, subsequent U.S. policy has been generally to support UN mediation efforts. Additionally, the U.S. has sometimes undertaken independent initiatives such as the American-British-Canadian (ABC) comprehensive plan of 1978. A consistent theme of all Administrations from President Carter until the present day is that the U.S. should seek to ensure the independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of Cyprus. (Brief excerpts from presidential statements may be found in the glossary.)

In both its first and second terms, the Clinton Administration has remained actively seized of the Cyprus problem. As a presidential candidate in 1992 then Governor Clinton stated that the Cyprus problem should be resolved in accordance with the "fundamental principles of human rights and democratic norms and practices." In January 1995 President Clinton appointed Mr. Richard Beattie to be Special Presidential Emissary on Cyprus. In September 1995 the House of Representatives passed a Concurrent Resolution (H.Con.Res.42) calling for speedy progress toward a just and peaceful settlement of the Cyprus problem and endorsing the concept of demilitarization for Cyprus.

A New U.S. Initiative for Cyprus

In 1996, recognizing that Cyprus' impending EU accession offered an opportunity for a positive U.S. engagement, then Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke announced a new initiative on Cyprus. The effective launch of this initiative was delayed in the face of renewed (and legally baseless) Turkish territorial claims in the Aegean and political uncertainty in Turkey.

During the 1996 presidential election campaign President Clinton declared that resolution of the Cyprus problem would be a "high priority" for his second term. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has said that Cyprus constitutes both a moral obligation for the U.S. as well as an important U.S. security interest. In January 1997 then National Security Adviser Anthony Lake said that the continuing stalemate in Cyprus was one of the world's top "outrages."

In June 1997, the Administration appointed Mr. Holbrooke as Special Presidential Emissary and Ambassador Thomas Miller as State Department Coordinator for Cyprus. Both have undertaken multiple visits to the region.

Developments in 1997-1999

From July-November 1997 a series of meetings took place between President Clerides and Mr. Denktash. From July 9-13 and August 11-16 respectively, they held a series of meetings under UN auspices in Troutbec, New York, and Montreux, Switzerland. In July and September they held informal meetings in Nicosia to discuss humanitarian and security issues. In November they met again at the invitation of Mr. Holbrooke in Nicosia. The UN-sponsored talks were not productive. On each occasion, Mr. Denktash refused to accept for discussion consultative documents offered by the UN mediator, Mr. Diego Cordovez.

During these talks, Mr. Denktash's negotiating position was unclear. On some occasions, he has referred to the Set of Ideas as his preferred basis of negotiation but on others has repudiated key components of these ideas. His most recent position is to insist on recognition of the occupied areas as a separate sovereign entity as a pre-condition for settlement negotiations and to demand the withdrawal of Cyprus' application to the EU. The former demand is at odds with Security Council resolutions and other determinations that Cyprus must remain a unitary state with a single sovereignty and that settlement talks must take place on an intercommunal basis. The latter demand implying a linkage between Turkey's EU accession and the EU negotiations with Cyprus was described on May 3, 1998 by Ambassador Holbrooke as "not realistic." On May 22, Under Secretary for Political Affairs Thomas Pickering reiterated the State Department's "disappointment" at the Turkish side for raising these "new preconditions."

"President Clerides is open, offering a multiplicity of solutions, willing to cooperate. I did not find the same openness from Mr. Denktash"

Following the impasse at the Swiss talks, the President of the Security Council, Sir John Weston, faulted the Turkish side for "impeding substantive progress." By contrast, the Security Council noted that President Clerides had been "flexible and cooperative." Speaking at a Capitol Hill Conference on June 10, 1998 Senator Gordon Smith (R-OR), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on European Affairs stated that "President Clerides is open, offering a multiplicity of solutions, willing to cooperate. I did not find the same openness from Mr. Denktash, but I found demands that frankly made negotiations very difficult to start."

On September 30, 1998, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan launched a new "Good Offices" mission under the leadership of his special representative Dame Ann Hercus. She has conducted multiple exploratory meetings in Cyprus and the region. In its resolutions 1217 (1998) and 1218 (1998) of December 22, 1998, the UN Security Council endorsed this initiative and requested the Secretary-General to work towards achieving "substantial progress on the core aspects of a comprehensive Cyprus settlement." Resolution 1218 emphasized the following measures:

• An undertaking to refrain from the threat or use of force or violence as a means to resolve the Cyprus problem;

• A staged process aimed at limiting and then substantially reducing the level of all troops and armaments on Cyprus;

• Implementation of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) package of measures aimed at reducing tensions along the cease-fire lines, and a commitment to enter into discussions with UNFICYP with a view to early agreement on further specific and related tension-reducing steps, including demining along the buffer zone;

• Further progress in the area of tension-reduction;

• Efforts to achieve substantive progress on the core aspects of a comprehensive Cyprus settlement;

• Other measures that will build trust and cooperation between the two sides.

The Cyprus Government welcomed the UN initiative and Security Council resolutions. Foreign Minister Yiannakis Cassoulides stated on December 24, 1998 that "the Cyprus government considers these two resolutions positively because we believe they create some hopeful prospects regarding efforts to open a road on the core issues of the Cyprus problem, but mainly for the reduction of all armaments with an aim to the demilitarization of the island." Both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots took the opposite approach, issuing highly negative statements. Mr. Denktash restated that he would not participate in peace talks until his regime is recognized as a sovereign entity.

Developments in Greek-Turkish relations are also relevant. Following a meeting in Madrid convened by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on 8 July, 1997, Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis and Turkish President Suleyman Demirel released a communiqué known as the Madrid Agreement. Among the Agreement's provisions were respect for the principles of international law and international agreements and a commitment to settle disputes by peaceful means based on mutual consent and without the use of force or threat of force.

Although the Agreement did not mention Cyprus by name, it gave rise to hope of Turkish adherence to international law as framed in successive Security Council resolutions. The meeting between the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers at the November 3-4, 1997 Summit of Southeast European States renewed these hopes. Despite repeated meetings between Greek and Turkish ministers at various fora (for example, the Balkan Defense Ministers meeting in Athens on January 12, 1999), these hopes have gone unfulfilled. Both the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey continue to take actions that violate the international consensus founded on the rule of law and the status of Cyprus as a unitary state.

Prospects

The roles of the Turkish military and the US Congress will be crucial.

The lack of progress at the talks between President Clerides and Mr. Denktash, the current deadlock arising from the rejection of the UN initiative by the Turkish side, the injection of new (internationally unacceptable) Turkish conditions, and Mr. Denktash's cancellation of intercommunal talks are discouraging. Although in the non-governmental field there are some tentative signs of progress, such the "The Economic Cooperation to Protect the Mutual Interests" conference attended by Greek and Turkish Cypriot businessmen in Istanbul on December 13, 1998, the improved telephone links launched in May 1998 and various internationally-funded intercommunal projects (now suspended on the order of Mr. Denktash), in themselves these initiatives will not be enough.

Of greater importance is the role of the military in Turkey. The Turkish constitution grants the military far greater prerogatives over foreign policy and national security matters than is normal in western democracies. For all practical purposes, the final decisions over Cyprus will be made by the military not by the civilian leadership.

At present Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots are focusing their efforts on legitimizing de facto partition brought about by the Turkish invasion and on suspending Cyprus' EU accession negotiations. In his reaction to SCR 1218 (1998) Mr. Denktash reiterated this demand and drew immediate support from Turkey. These obstacles on the Turkish side have a familiar ring. In May 1994, for example, the UN Secretary-General reported that the Security Council "found itself faced with an already familiar scenario: the absence of agreement due essentially to the lack of political will on the part of the Turkish Cypriot community."

If this approach continues, the prognosis for progress is bleak. If, on the other hand, the Turkish side is prepared to offer concrete evidence that it is ready to enter into good faith negotiations based on the principles set out in the High Level Agreements and SCR 939, including internationally enforceable guarantees that meet the concerns of all Cypriots within a single unified state, a settlement may be within reach.

In seeking a settlement, the role of the international community, international organizations, and national parliaments will be critical. A leading role for the U.S. will be indispensable. Only the U.S. has the range of regional economic, political, and security relationships that will be necessary to persuade the interested parties--first and foremost Turkey--to commit themselves to a good faith negotiations. In setting the course of U.S. policy, Congressional opinion will be vital. Congress is an essential partner in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy and must play its constitutional role in shaping U.S. policy toward the Cyprus problem.

STATEMENT OF AHI POLICY

The Cyprus problem has been on the international agenda for many years and most prominently since Turkey's illegal 1974 invasion. Years of negotiation and international initiatives have foundered on the barrier of the military-controlled Turkish government's intransigence. The absence of progress damages important national interests of the United States in the Eastern Mediterranean and compromises fundamental American values such as rejection of aggression and respect for the rule of law. The time has come for a realistic approach in which the U.S. engages the true issues.

Turkish obstructionism is not the only guilty party. Faulty U.S. policy is also responsible for the damaging failure to produce a settlement. It is time to recognize that the U.S. approach adopted since 1974 of treating Cyprus as a traditional diplomatic problem where 'meet-in-the-middle' negotiations involving compromises by each side has failed. Despite compromises made by Cyprus, Turkey has not reciprocated. To break the deadlock, the U.S. must follow a realistic approach based on the fundamentally clear and straightforward issues underlying the Cyprus problem. These are:

• The Cyprus problem is one of aggression, illegal occupation and attempted dismemberment by Turkey, whereby the Republic of Cyprus is the victim and Turkey is the aggressor. There is no difference in principle between Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and Turkey's invasion of Cyprus. Indeed, as a U.S. NATO ally and EU aspirant Turkey should be held to the highest standards of compliance with international law.

• For 24 years, Turkey has violated the will of the United States and the United Nations to cease its illegal occupation of Cyprus and not to recognize or give any other assistance to the illegally occupied areas. Instead it has reinforced its forces there and illegally sent Turkish settlers there.

• The United States bears a national responsibility for the Cyprus tragedy. Speaking publicly in Nicosia on November 11, 1997 Ambassador Richard Holbrooke described U.S. actions in 1974 as "shameful." At a Capitol Hill conference on Cyprus on June 10, 1998 Ambassador Tom Boyatt, the State Department's Cyprus desk officer in 1974, stated that "a Cyprus solution is possible if the U.S. steps up to its responsibilities and remembers its own guilt. So we have a redemption factor here."

The time has come to restore these essential facts to the center of policy. Turkey is overwhelmingly responsible for the Cyprus problem by its aggression and illegal occupation. Instead of a barren process of negotiation which allows Turkey to deny this fact and the U.S. to divert attention from the real issues, the Administration should now:

• State that it is ending its current approach and that future talks will take place on the basis of restoring the status quo ante and the rule of law as it applied before Turkey's 1974 illegal invasion.

• Identify Turkey and its military-dominated government as the responsible party for the Cyprus problem and recognize that the Turkish military is the key, not Mr. Denktash.

• Demand that Turkey complies immediately with all relevant UN Security Council resolutions, cease all measures to integrate the occupied areas with Turkey, immediately withdraw all occupation troops, and agree to the demilitarization of the island.

• Demand the restoration of constitutional government for all of Cyprus based on majority rule, the rule of law, and protection of minority rights.

• Institute a realistic diplomatic approach including coercive measures against Turkey such as sanctions and denial of assistance from the international financial institutions in the event of Turkish non-compliance or any further violation of international law by Turkey in Cyprus.

Glossary of Terms

(the following definitions seek to reflect conventional international usage).

The Republic of Cyprus: this is the only legitimate state on Cyprus. It is a member of the UN, the British Commonwealth, and the Council of Europe. Its territory extends to the entire island of Cyprus. Its form of government is a presidential, multi-party democracy.

The Government of Cyprus: this is only internationally recognized government in Cyprus. The current president is Glafcos Clerides.

The "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus": this is the illegal administration in the area under Turkish occupation. Under SCR 541 (1983) this administration has no international validity or legal status. No state other than Turkey has recognized this entity.

Bicommunal: this recognizes that, within the framework of a unified state, there are two communities in Cyprus, each of which is entitled to constitutionally protected rights and powers. This characterizes the fundamental nature of the proposed federation.

Bizonal: this recognizes that there would be two federated states in Cyprus, each of which would enjoy substantial autonomy on internal matters.

Buffer zone: this is the strip of land between the cease-fire lines patrolled by UNFICYP.

Cease-fire Lines: these are the 1974 cease fire lines of the Cyprus National Guard and the Turkish invasion force. South of the line is the area under Cyprus government control; north of the line is the area under Turkish occupation.

Confidence-Building Measures: these have included agreement to open the fenced area of Famagusta and to reopen the international airport of Nicosia and other projects of bicommunal cooperation.

Demilitarization: this means the removal of all foreign forces from Cyprus and the total disbanding of all Cypriot forces. (This does not include British troops on the UK sovereign bases areas.) A comprehensive proposal for demilitarization was submitted to the UN by President Clerides in December 1993.

Enclaved: these are the Greek and Maronite populations in the areas under Turkish military occupation. Despite the provisions of the Vienna III agreement under which Turkey guaranteed their basic rights, their numbers have declined from 20,000 in 1974 to less than 500 today.

Federation: this implies a unified, central, and federal Government of Cyprus with exclusive sovereignty and with sufficient powers to ensure the unity of the state; it is to be distinguished from a confederation which implies two or more co-existent sovereign authorities joined together loosely.

Guarantor Powers: in the treaties establishing Cyprus' independence in 1960 certain rights were reserved to Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom as guarantor powers.

High-Level Agreements: in 1977 and 1979 agreements were reached between the then Presidents of Cyprus, respectively Archbishop Makarios and Mr. Spiros Kyprianou, and the Turkish Cypriot leader Mr. Denktash about the basic principles required for a Cyprus settlement.

Human Rights: violations by the Turkish occupying forces have been recorded by many international organizations. In addition to the abuse of individual rights, violations have included destruction of cultural and religious heritage.

Indirect military talks: this refers to a proposal for talks between the Cyprus National Guard and the Turkish military authorities under the auspices of UNFICYP.

Missing Persons: this refers to a group of over 1,600 Greek Cypriots (including civilians) known to have been in the hands of the Turkish military after the conclusion of hostilities in 1974 but whose fate is unknown. 5 US citizens are numbered among the missing.

Multinational Force: this refers to a proposal under which, following agreement on a settlement, UNFICYP would be replaced by a multinational force under an international commander with a Security Council mandate. Both Turkey and Greece could contribute contingents to the force. The force would have responsibility for overseeing the security aspects of a constitutional settlement.

Partition, Secession (taksim): these concepts imply the establishment of two or more sovereign entities on Cyprus and thus offend against the concept of federation.

Politically equal: this means that both communities must have equal political status and be able to participate in the political process effectively. It does not imply precise numerical equality.

Presidential campaign statements:

Jimmy Carter: "The impasse on Cyprus must be broken down. The U.S. must be prepared to work...to insure the independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of Cyprus." 1976

Ronald Reagan: "The tragic situation in Cyprus has lasted six years. It must not continue. I support UN GA Resolution 3212" 1980

George Bush: "We seek for Cyprus a constitutional democracy based on majority rule, the rule of law, and the protection of minority rights." 1988

Bill Clinton: "The U.S. and the world community will not accept the permanent division of Cyprus. Such a settlement must be consistent with the fundamental principles of human rights." 1992

Bill Clinton: "I have made the resolution of the Cyprus problem a high foreign policy priority." 1996

Refugees: following the 1974 invasion some 200,00 Greek Cypriots were forced to leave their homes. This constituted approximately 80% of the population in what is now the area under Turkish military occupation.

Set of Ideas: put forward by the UN Secretary-General in 1989 as the basis for advancing negotiations. The ideas were subsequently reformulated and endorsed by SCR 774 (1992) of August, 1992. For the purposes of the ensuing discussions, these proposals were provisionally accepted by the Greek Cypriots but were rejected by the Turkish Cypriots.

Settlement, Colonization, Displacement: this refers to the illegal importation of over 100,000 settlers from Turkey onto Cyprus. Figures from 1996 indicate that, together with emigration of Turkish Cypriots, this has had the effect of changing the demography of Cyprus to the extent that native-born Turkish Cypriots are now in a minority in the area under Turkish occupation. Such deliberate demographic changes are illegal under the Geneva Convention.

Single citizenship: this means that all Cyprus citizens will enjoy a single citizenship regulated by the central government. No community would be able to confer citizenship.

Single International Personality: this means that, in its dealings with foreign entities and on all international matters, sole authority is vested in the central federal government.

Sovereign Base Areas: these areas cover 99 square miles. They were retained by the UK in 1960. They are not considered part of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus.

Territorial apportionment: in the course of formulating the "set of ideas" a map, the "Ghali map", containing certain proposals for territorial adjustments was put forward by the UN Secretary-General. These proposals were rejected by the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

Treaty of Alliance: this refers to the 1960 Treaty between Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus under which Greece and Turkey are permitted to station, respectively, 950 and 650 troops on Cyprus.

Treaty of Establishment: this refers to the 1960 treaty between UK, Greece, Turkey, and the Republic of Cyprus that brought about the independence of Cyprus.

Treaty of Guarantee: this refers to the 1960 Treaty between Britain, Greece, and Turkey on the one part and the republic of Cyprus on the other part that afforded each state certain rights of intervention in order to maintain the constitutional status quo. Security guarantees(short of unilateral rights(will be a key component of any settlement agreement.

UNFICYP: this is the UN force in Cyprus. First installed in 1964, the majority of costs are now met by voluntary contributions from the governments of Cyprus and Greece.

Unified state: this implies a central and federal state of Cyprus with exclusive sovereignty and with sufficient powers to ensure the unity of the state

Union with another Country (enosis) : this refers to jurisdictional mergers with foreign nation states. It does not refer to membership of multilateral or regional organizations, such as the EU or British Commonwealth.

Unmanning: this refers to a 1989 agreement to pull back Cyprus National Guard and Turkish military personnel from positions along the cease-fire lines, particularly within Nicosia.

March 17, 1999